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I
INTRODUCTION
“Stealing Sunshine” is a trial-advocacy technique whereby an attorney
discloses, in the opening statement or on direct examination of a witness,
information that seems advantageous to the opponent’s case, before the latter
elicits or reveals it, in order to mitigate its expected impact on fact-finders. We
hypothesize that stealing sunshine is indeed helpful to a litigant’s case. This
study is the first to examine the efficacy of this tactic, both theoretically and
empirically, contributing to the growing literature on the impact of various trialadvocacy techniques on decision-makers’ perceptions and trial outcomes.1
Given the primacy of our work, we draw on existing literature on a related
courtroom technique commonly known as “stealing thunder,” which is—in a
sense—the mirror image of the tactic under scrutiny.
II
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A. Stealing Thunder
James W. McElhaney was probably the first to use the term “stealing
thunder” to describe a trial technique in which an attorney divulges information
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1. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The
Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 1353, 1357, 1380–85 (2009) (finding significant association between the jury’s learning of a
criminal record and conviction in cases with weak evidence); see also id. at 1358–64 (surveying prior
research on the impact of knowing a defendant’s criminal record on jurors’ and judges’ guilt
perceptions and verdicts); Joseph L. Gastwirth & Michael D. Sinclair, A Re-Examination of the 1966
Kalven–Zeisel Study of Judge–Jury Agreements and Disagreements and Their Causes, 3 LAW,
PROBABILITY & RISK 169, 174 (2004) (finding, based on data presented in HARRY KALVEN & HANS
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966), that in “close” cases a superior defense counsel, a sympathetic
defendant, and prior criminal record affect judgments and generate disagreement between jurors and
judges).

PERRY & WEIMANN SAKS

34

2/25/2011

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 74:33

that is detrimental to her case, such as evidence that impairs the credibility of her
own witness, before it is elicited or revealed by the opponent.2 For example, in a
criminal trial, the defendant’s attorney may bring out the defendant’s prior
record on direct examination.3 Similarly, in a civil trial, an attorney may reveal
that her own expert witness expressed an opposite opinion in a previous case.4
In so doing, the attorney aspires to take out at least some of the sting of the
opponent’s case.5
Disclosing harmful information about oneself is sensible only as a
preemptive measure. If P’s opponent is not likely to reveal the harmful
information, neither should P, because a litigant will generally be better off if
evidence that might impair her case is not revealed at all. Put differently, nothunder is preferable to any alternative.6 But under conventional wisdom
stealing thunder is preferable to thunder, although both are inferior to nothunder.7 A common piece of advice in trial-advocacy manuals is that where a
weakness is apparent and known to the opponent, and the opponent is likely to
use it, “you should volunteer it. If you don’t, your opponent will, with twice the
impact.”8 Trial lawyers have endorsed and utilized this advice before its validity
has been empirically tested.9
From a theoretical perspective, the efficacy of stealing thunder is open to
question. On the one hand, there are good reasons to believe that it works. First
and foremost, a person who reveals information that seems against her best
interest is deemed more credible.10 Clearly, revealing negative information will
2. James W. McElhaney, Stealing Their Thunder, 13 LITIG., Spring 1987, at 59, 59.
3. Id. at 60; see also JAMES W. MCELHANEY, MCELHANEY’S TRIAL NOTEBOOK 519 (3d ed.
1994); James A. Protin, What Is a “Crime Relevant to Credibility”?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1125, 1130 (1995);
Kipling D. Williams et al., The Effects of Stealing Thunder in Criminal and Civil Trials, 17 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 597, 600–03 (1993). Note that in the U.S. federal system, a criminal defendant who
preemptively introduces evidence of prior convictions on direct examination waives the right to appeal
an in limine ruling allowing the prosecutor to use such evidence. Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753,
760 (2000).
4. See, e.g., Kipling D. Williams & Lara Dolnik, Revealing the Worst First: Stealing Thunder as a
Social Influence Strategy, in SOCIAL INFLUENCE: DIRECT AND INDIRECT PROCESSES 213, 217 (Joseph
P. Forgas & Kipling D. Williams eds., 2001); Williams et al., supra note 3, at 603–07.
5. McElhaney, supra note 2, at 59.
6. See THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 47–48 (3d ed. 1992)
(“There is obviously no point in volunteering a weakness that would never be raised at trial.”).
7. See, e.g., L. Timothy Perrin, Pricking Boils, Preserving Error: On the Horns of a Dilemma After
Ohler v. United States, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 615, 616 (2001) (“Conventional wisdom advises trial
advocates to disclose the weaknesses in their cases at trial before the other side has the opportunity to
exaggerate their significance in the case.”); Michael J. Saks, Flying Blind in the Courtroom: Trying
Cases Without Knowing What Works or Why, 101 YALE L.J. 1177, 1180 (1992) (book review)
(“Conventional tactical wisdom holds that we should try to present the information to the jury before
our adversary gets the chance to, so as to ‘take the sting out’ of the evidence or increase the perception
of our credibility or fairness.”).
8. MAUET, supra note 6, at 48; see also Williams et al., supra note 3, at 597.
9. See Perrin, supra note 7, at 621; Williams et al., supra note 3, at 597–98.
10. See NEIL BREWER & KIPLING D. WILLIAMS, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: AN EMPIRICAL
PERSPECTIVE 312 (2005); Lara Dolnik et al., Stealing Thunder as a Courtroom Tactic Revisited:
Processes and Boundaries, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 267, 269 (2003); Perrin, supra note 7, at 617, 620;
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prove futile if it incriminates the counsel’s client, or contradicts one of the
counsel’s own witnesses. But as long as the harmful information is of secondary
importance, disclosing it strengthens the speaker’s overall credibility with
respect to the more important issues. Second, stealing thunder enables the
lawyer to frame the evidence in the least harmful way to the client: “The key is
to mention the weakness without emphasis and to present it in its least
damaging light . . . .”11 Third and closely related, stealing thunder enables the
lawyer to “warn” fact-finders about the upcoming harmful evidence, thereby
making them more resistant to its submission by the opponent.12 The presumed
psychological effect of warning and framing may be analogous to the
physiological effect of immunization through the preemptive administration of
weakened pathogens.13 Fourth, according to the commodity theory, the scarcer
the information, the more valuable it is. If a piece of information is provided by
both parties, it is less scarce and hence, less significant (“old news is no news”).14
Fifth, when one reveals negative information about oneself, the addressees
endeavor to resolve the apparent inconsistency between the representation and
what they expect that person to present by changing the significance or meaning
of the representation to better fit their expectation.15
On the other hand, there are good reasons to believe that the tactic might be
detrimental to one’s client. First, due to the primacy effect and the confirmation
bias, information heard earlier in the trial may set up a negative schema of the
witness that fact-finders will use to interpret subsequent evidence they hear.16
Second, assuming that the opponent will use the negative evidence anyway,
stealing thunder increases its salience and hence, its availability.17 Information
mentioned twice is more easily remembered, and may thus have a stronger
impact. Third, endorsing the negative information reinforces its veracity,
turning it into undisputed evidence to the client’s detriment.18
The first empirical study of the effectiveness of stealing thunder was
published in 1993.19 The study showed that by stealing the opponent’s thunder,
one gains credibility, and is consequently treated more favorably by factfinders. The tactic was found equally effective in criminal and civil trials,
whether used by the defendant or by the prosecutor or plaintiff. While stealing
Kathryn M. Stanchi, Playing with Fire: The Science of Confronting Adverse Material in Legal Advocacy,
60 RUTGERS L. REV. 381, 389–90 (2008); Williams et al., supra note 3, at 598.
11. MAUET, supra note 6, at 48; see also Perrin, supra note 7, at 617, 621; Stanchi, supra note 10, at
388, 418; Williams et al., supra note 3, at 598.
12. See Stanchi, supra note 10, at 388, 418; Williams et al., supra note 3, at 598–99.
13. See Stanchi, supra note 10, at 399–408, 418 (discussing the inoculation theory).
14. See Dolnik et al., supra note 10, at 269; Stanchi, supra note 10, at 420; Williams et al., supra
note 3, at 599.
15. See BREWER & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 312; Dolnik et al., supra note 10, at 269–70;
Stanchi, supra note 10, at 420; Williams et al., supra note 3, at 599.
16. See Dolnik et al., supra note 10, at 268; Williams et al., supra note 3, at 600.
17. See Dolnik et al., supra note 10, at 268; Williams et al., supra note 3, at 600.
18. See Dolnik et al., supra note 10, at 268.
19. Williams et al., supra note 3.
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thunder emerged and was initially studied as a courtroom technique,
subsequent studies have demonstrated its efficacy in other contexts, such as
interpersonal relationships,20 organizational crisis management,21 and politics.22
More recent studies examined possible explanations for these results. For
instance, while the initial study found that the effect of the tactic may be
attributed to enhanced credibility,23 another found that stealing thunder may be
effective even if it does not change the fact-finder’s perception of the witness’s
credibility.24 The latter also suggests that stealing thunder may be equally and at
times more effective without framing the harmful information in a way that
reduces its importance.25 It remains unclear why this is so, and under what
circumstances, if any, framing may augment the effect of stealing thunder.26
Research has also raised doubts about the “old news is no news” argument,
finding that non-repetition of the negative information by the opponent did not
diminish the effect of stealing thunder.27 Finally, there is some empirical support
for the hypothesis that in cases of stealing thunder, fact-finders change the
meaning of the representation to better fit their expectation.28
The boundaries of the tactic’s efficacy have also been explored. For
example, the initial study examined whether the effectiveness of the tactic
depended on the exact timing of its use, namely early or relatively late in trial
(but prior to the thunder), and found that stealing thunder was equally effective
irrespective of the exact timing.29 On the other hand, “acknowledging thunder”
(after the opponent has already revealed the negative information) is
ineffective.30 Two studies found that stealing thunder reduced the damaging
impact of negative information even when the information was relatively

20. See, e.g., Alvin Law, Stealing Thunder from HIV: Understanding the Processes Behind Timing
the Disclosure of HIV to Potential Relationship Partners (Dec. 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Purdue University) (on file with Purdue University); Kathy Zablocki, Stealing Thunder About Having
a Sexually Transmitted Disease (1996) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Toledo).
21. See, e.g., Laura M. Arpan & David R. Roskos-Ewoldsen, Stealing Thunder: Analysis of the
Effects of Proactive Disclosure of Crisis Information, 31 PUB. REL. REV. 425 (2005); Laura M. Arpan &
Donnalyn Pompper, Stormy Weather: Testing “Stealing Thunder” as a Crisis Communication Strategy to
Improve Communication Flow Between Organizations and Journalists, 29 PUB. REL. REV. 291 (2003).
22. See, e.g., Sherri A. Ondrus, Scooping the Press: Reducing Newspaper Coverage of Political
Scandal By Stealing Thunder (May 1998) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Toledo) (on
file with University of Toledo).
23. Williams et al., supra note 3, at 602–03.
24. Dolnik et al., supra note 10, at 283, 285. But cf. Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 1, at 1361, 1387–
88 (noting that “[a]lthough the defendant’s credibility can be harmed by knowledge of a [criminal]
record, credibility does not appear to be the main way that criminal record information affects the guilt
judgments of jurors.”).
25. Dolnik et al., supra note 10, at 270–75, 283, 285; see also Williams & Dolnik, supra note 4, at
221–22.
26. Dolnik et al., supra note 10, at 285.
27. Id. at 278–79, 283, 285.
28. Id. at 278–79, 283–84.
29. Williams et al., supra note 3, at 603–07.
30. Williams & Dolnik, supra note 4, at 220.
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severe.31 However, it seems reasonable to assume that from a certain level of
severity, stealing thunder might become counterproductive. As we stated
above, revealing negative information is injudicious if it incriminates the
counsel’s client, or contradicts one of the counsel’s own witnesses.
Other studies have examined whether the effectiveness of stealing thunder
is affected by the personal characteristics of the stealer (for example, race)32 or
the fact-finder (for example, motivation and ability to process information).33
The opponent’s use of counterstrategies has also been investigated. For
instance, non-repetition of the negative information by the opponent (that is,
ignoring) did not diminish the effect of stealing thunder.34 In contrast, it was
found that one’s opponent can mitigate the effect of the tactic by explaining the
manipulation to the fact-finders.35
B. Stealing Sunshine
Hitherto, empirical studies have focused on preemptive disclosure of
negative information about oneself (that is, stealing thunder). Our study offers
a preliminary examination of the related yet unexplored technique of “stealing
sunshine.” From a theoretical perspective, stealing sunshine is analogous to
stealing thunder in many respects. On the one hand, a person who reveals
information that seems against his best interest may be deemed generally more
credible and therefore more persuasive.36 Stealing sunshine also enables the
lawyer to frame the evidence in the least beneficial way to the opponent,37 and
to “warn” fact-finders about the upcoming evidence, thereby making them
more resistant to its submission by the opponent. If a piece of information is
provided by both parties, it is less scarce and hence, less valuable.38 And when
one reveals positive information about one’s opponent, the addressees
endeavor to resolve the apparent inconsistency between the representation and

31. Id. at 220–21 (examining the 2003 Baldwin and Williams study on stealing thunder in a political
context).
32. Id. at 222–23 (examining the 1994 White and Harkins study and the 1999 Petty, Flemming, and
White study indicating that race attributed to the source of a persuasive message).
33. Id. at 223–24 (analyzing the 1995 Ondrus and Williams study investigating stealing thunder in
the political domain).
34. Dolnik et al., supra note 10, at 278–79, 283, 285; Williams & Dolnik, supra note 4, at 224–25.
35. Dolnik et al., supra note 10, at 276–79, 283, 285; Williams & Dolnik, supra note 4, at 224–25.
36. We explained that evidence concerning the possible effect of stealing thunder on witness and
lawyer credibility is inconclusive. See supra notes 10, 23–24 and accompanying text. So if stealing
sunshine is truly effective, the hypothesis that its effectiveness may be attributed to enhanced credibility
merits further research.
37. Indeed, the evidence on stealing thunder suggests that framing might not matter. See supra
notes 25–26 and accompanying text. But we believe that the body of evidence on this issue is currently
sparse. Moreover, it relates to a specific type of framing in a very specific context. In our view, it cannot
and should not be used to draw broad conclusions.
38. Again, although evidence on stealing thunder suggests that scarcity might not matter (see supra
note 27 and accompanying text), the evidence is too sparse to be conclusive.
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what they expect that person to present by changing the significance or meaning
of the representation to better fit their expectation.
On the other hand, due to the primacy effect and the confirmation bias,
information heard earlier in the trial may set up a positive schema of the
opponent that fact-finders will use to interpret subsequent evidence they hear.
Assuming that the opponent will use the positive information anyway, stealing
sunshine increases its salience and hence, its availability. And endorsing the
positive information reinforces its veracity, turning it into undisputed evidence.
Additionally, research shows that people hearing secondhand information make
more extreme judgments of the target person than people hearing the
information firsthand from the target person. In several experiments, first-order
listeners watched the target person describe reprehensible actions that he or she
committed, and then told the story to second-order listeners. The second-order
listeners rated the target more negatively than first-order listeners. This
phenomenon is known as the teller-listener extremity effect,39 and has also been
observed in cases of disclosure of positive information.40 It has been suggested
that one of the explanations for this phenomenon, possibly the strongest, is that
boasting affects the general impression (or liking) of a person. First-order
listeners hear the information in first-person form (“I”), and may think the
target person was boasting, whereas second-order listeners hear the information
in third-person form (“She” or “He”) and are less likely to think the target was
boasting.41 So theoretically, an attorney would better serve the interests of his
client by letting the opponent reveal the positive information about the client.
This sheds doubts on the efficacy of stealing sunshine.
Taking into consideration existing literature on stealing thunder, we
hypothesize that stealing sunshine is comparably helpful to a litigant’s case. If
we are correct, volunteering positive information about the client’s opponent
may be consistent with the attorney’s duty of zealous advocacy.
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the defendant reveals positive information about himself. Forty participants
received the Stealing Sunshine version, in which the prosecutor reveals the
same information about the defendant.
Materials. The cases presented were based on those used by Lara Dolnik
and fellow researchers in 2003 for their first study. The defendant was driving
home from a party. He was involved in a head-on collision with another car on
a winding, unlit road at 3:00 a.m. The defendant incurred minor injuries, but the
other driver, a young woman, died after being trapped in the car with her twoyear-old child. The child survived with minor injuries. The defendant was then
charged with causing death by dangerous driving.44 The main modification was
that the relevant information about the defendant, revealed by a different party
in each of the two conditions, was advantageous to the defendant (that is,
sunshine), not detrimental (that is, thunder). In the Sunshine condition, the
defendant revealed positive information about himself, that is, he had no
criminal record, not even a traffic violation, and was a volunteer for a non-profit
traffic-safety organization. In the Stealing Sunshine condition, the same positive
information was revealed by the prosecutor.
Admittedly, the structure of our Stealing Sunshine condition may seem
unrealistic. The defendant would normally reveal positive information about
himself on direct examination, so the prosecutor could not steal the sunshine on
his cross-examination. This study nevertheless used this structure for three
interrelated reasons. First, we wanted to ensure that the only difference
between the two conditions was the identity of the party revealing the
information, and that all other things (for example, stage of trial and context)
were equal. Second, this study is essentially a follow-up to stealing-thunder
studies. Only if our methodology accords with that of previous studies, a
systematic comparison of the two tactics will be possible in the long run. Third
and foremost, the current study tests the effectiveness of the tactic, not the
likelihood of a particular manner of its utilization. The only relevant question is
whether the tactic is generally viable, and we believe that it is: The prosecutor
in a criminal trial can definitely steal the defendant’s sunshine, at times in the
exact manner presented in our Stealing Sunshine condition. He can do so in at
least three ways. The prosecutor presents the initial opening statement,45 so he
can steal the defendant’s sunshine at this stage. The prosecutor can also do so
on direct examination of one of the prosecution witnesses. Lastly, the
prosecutor can steal the defendant’s sunshine on cross-examination of the latter
if the positive information has not been presented on direct examination of the
defendant for some reason,46 and the defense attorney is likely to reveal it on
redirect examination or at a later stage.47

44. Dolnik et al., supra note 10, at 271.
45. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.7(a) (3d ed. 2000).
46. For instance, the defense attorney may reserve some of the positive information about the
defendant for later stages in order to take advantage of the recency effect. See Kurt A. Carlson & J.
Edward Russo, Biased Interpretation of Evidence by Mock Jurors, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 91,
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After reading highlights of the case and the trial transcript, participants
answered several questions about their perceptions of the defendant and the
victim. They were asked to determine whether the defendant was guilty, and to
evaluate (on a 1–10 scale, 1 being the lowest estimate) the measure of the
defendant’s guilt, the defendant’s credibility and remorse, their sympathy for
the victim and for the defendant, and their identification with the victim and
with the defendant. Finally, they were required to assign the proper punishment
(0–10 years in prison). These measures served as the dependent variables.
Procedure. The experiment was conducted on an individual basis. Each
subject received a link to an online questionnaire that included one of two
descriptions of the particular case. As explained, some participants were
exposed to the Sunshine condition (that is, the defendant’s revelation of
positive information about himself) and others were exposed to the Stealing
Sunshine condition (that is, the prosecutor’s revelation of the same positive
information about the defendant). This study examined the effects of stealing
sunshine by comparing the means of the dependent variables for the two
groups.
A Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was employed to test whether
there were clusters of variables. A PCA is a mathematical procedure that
transforms a large number of interrelated variables into a smaller number of
uncorrelated variables (“principal components”), which are ordered so that the
first few retain most of the variation present in all the original variables.48 The
main applications of this technique are: (1) to reduce the number of variables
and (2) to detect structure in the relationships between variables, that is, to
classify them. Put differently, a PCA is applied as a data-reduction and
structure-detection method.
IV
RESULTS
Nine measures were used to study the impact of Stealing Sunshine. Table 1
displays participants’ verdicts and perceptions of the parties for each of the two
conditions (Sunshine or Stealing Sunshine). Note that the first dependent
variable is dichotomous, whereas the other eight are discrete.

99 (2001) (finding “consistent evidence of a recency effect in the impact of the trial information for
both prospective jurors and students . . . .”).
47. For example, it might be revealed during the sentencing procedure.
48. See IAN JOLLIFFE, PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS 1 (2d ed. 2002).
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Table 1: Participants’ Verdicts and Perceptions
Sunshine
[n=42]
Variable
Guilt

Measure of Guilt

Punishment

Credibility_Defendant

Label
Do you think
the defendant is
guilty?
What is your
assessment of
defendant’s
guilt?
What is your
estimation of
the proper
punishment?
What is your
evaluation of
defendant’s
credibility?

Scale
0 = No
1 = Yes

M
0.67

SD
0.477

Stealing
Sunshine
[n=40]
M
SD
0.80 0.405

1–10
1 = Definitely
Not Guilty
10 = Definitely
Guilty
0–10
Years in Jail

5.64

2.367

6.82

2.341

3.71

2.874

5.08

3.277

1–10
1 = Not Credible
10 = Very
Credible

6.57

2.188

6.62

2.761

Remorse_Defendant

What is your
evaluation of
defendant’s
remorse?

1–10
1 = No Remorse
10 = Deep
Remorse

7.10

2.377

6.45

2.726

Sympathy_Defendant

How much
sympathy did
you feel for the
defendant?
How much
sympathy did
you feel for the
victim?
What was your
level of
identification
with the
defendant?
What was your
level of
identification
with the victim?

1–10
1 = Low
10 = High

5.10

2.325

6.02

2.626

1–10
1 = Low
10 = High

8.55

1.656

8.02

2.391

1–10
1 = Low
10 = High

4.81

3.094

3.84

2.982

1–10
1 = Low
10 = High

5.02

2.937

3.88

2.830

Sympathy_Victim

Identification_Defendant

Identification_Victim
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To examine the efficacy of stealing sunshine, this study compared the means
of evaluations of participants exposed to the Sunshine condition with those of
participants exposed to the Stealing Sunshine condition. To detect a possible
association between the condition and the first dichotomous variable (guilty or
not guilty), this study used a Chi-Square test, and found no significant
difference between the two conditions.
To examine the differences between the two conditions in other variables,
this study used independent-samples t-tests. Thus, an independent-samples ttest revealed a significant difference between the two conditions in the measure
of guilt [t(80)=–2.27; p<0.05].49 The mean measure of guilt in the Stealing Sunshine
condition (M=6.83, SD=2.34) was significantly higher than in the Sunshine
condition (M=5.64, SD=2.37). The difference between the two conditions in
expected punishment also proved significant [t(80)=–2.00; p<0.05]. The mean
duration of incarceration in the Stealing Sunshine condition (M=5.08, SD=3.28)
was significantly higher than in the Sunshine condition (M=3.71, SD=2.87).
The difference between the two conditions in sympathy for the defendant
proved marginally significant [t(80)=–1.70; p=0.09]. Sympathy for the defendant in
the Stealing Sunshine condition (M=6.03, SD=2.63) was greater than in the
Sunshine condition (M=5.10, SD=2.33).50 This study also found a marginally
significant difference between the two conditions in identification with the
victim [t(80)=1.79; p=0.07]. Identification with the victim in the Stealing Sunshine
condition (M=3.88, SD=2.83) was weaker than in the Sunshine condition
(M=5.02, SD=2.93).

49. We used Levene’s test for equality of variances before comparing the samples’ means. Levene’s
test is an inferential statistic used to assess the equality of variance in different samples. The null
hypothesis tested by Levene’s test is that the two variances are equal. Howard Levene, Robust Tests for
Equality of Variances, in CONTRIBUTIONS TO PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
HAROLD HOTELLING 278 (Ingram Olkin et al. eds., 1960). Because the p-value of Levene’s test in our
case was greater than the critical value (0.05), the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, and we can
assume that the variances are not statistically different.
50. Cf. Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 1, at 1387 (finding a statistically significant negative
association between sympathy for defendants’ and jurors’ knowledge of defendants’ criminal records).
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Figure 1: A Comparison of Means in the Two Conditions (significant or
marginally significant differences only)

Finally, an independent-samples t-test yielded no significant differences
between the two conditions in the remaining four variables, namely defendant’s
credibility, defendant’s remorse, sympathy for the victim, and identification
with the defendant.51
To identify clusters of dependent discrete variables, a PCA was employed.
This study assumed independence of the components, and applied varimax
orthogonal rotation. Not surprisingly, this study identified three components
(according to the Kaiser criterion).52 The loadings after the orthogonal rotation
are presented in Table 2. The first component, hereinafter “Operative
Component,” included two variables: measure of guilt and punishment. This
component explained 31.02% of the total variance. The second component,
hereinafter “Attitude toward the Defendant,” included defendant’s credibility,
defendant’s remorse, sympathy for the defendant, and identification with the
defendant. It accounted for 18.09% of the variance. The third component,
hereinafter “Attitude toward the Victim,” included sympathy for the victim and
identification with the victim, and explained 13.15% of the variance. All three
components accounted for 62.26% of the total variance.

51. To examine the condition’s effect on the overall reaction to the case, a multivariate analysis of
variance (MANOVA) was performed. The condition exerted a significant impact on the multidependent variable that contained all dependent variables. However, this finding may be attributed to
the condition’s strong impact on a few dependent variables, and therefore does not add much to the
analysis.
52. The Kaiser criterion is a method for selecting the appropriate number of principal components.
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Table 2: Loadings of Variables on the Components after Rotation
Variable
Punishment
Measure of guilt
Sympathy_Defendant
Credibility
Identification_Defendant
Remorse
Identification_Victim
Sympathy_Victim

1
0.889
0.876

Component
2

3

0.808
0.794
0.539
0.413
0.830
0.638

To examine the effect of stealing sunshine on the overall reaction to the
case, a multivariate analysis (MANOVA) was performed using Hotelling’s
trace criterion. The condition (Sunshine or Stealing Sunshine) exerted a
significant impact on the multi-dependent-variable that contained the three
components [F(3,78)=4.22, p<0.01]. This study found a significant difference
between the two conditions in the Operative Component [Univariate
F(1,81)=5.76, p<0.05, Adj R²=0.06]. The value of the Operative Component in
the Sunshine condition (M=4.68, SD=2.42) was lower than in the Stealing
Sunshine condition (M=5.95, SD=2.37). In addition, this study found a
significant difference between the two conditions in Attitude toward the Victim
[Univariate F(1,81)=4.20, p<0.05, Adj R²=0.04]. The value of this component in
the Sunshine condition (M=6.83, SD=1.91) was higher than in the Stealing
Sunshine condition (M=5.95, SD=1.99). Finally, this study found no significant
difference between the two conditions in Attitude toward the Defendant
[Univariate F(1,81)=0.09, not significant].
Figure 2: A Comparison of Components in the Two Conditions (including
non-significant differences)
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V
DISCUSSION
This is the first empirical study of the effectiveness of the so-called stealing
sunshine technique. The results support the hypothesis that disclosing
information that seems advantageous to one’s opponent, before the latter elicits
or reveals it himself, mitigates its impact on fact-finders’ decisions. The
immediate practical implications of this study are self-evident: Volunteering
positive information about the client’s opponent may benefit the client, and
may therefore be consistent with the attorney’s fundamental duty of zealous
advocacy, at least under certain circumstances.53
This study tested the use of the tactic by the prosecution in a criminal case,
and found that the mean measure of guilt and the mean duration of
incarceration in the Stealing Sunshine condition were significantly higher than
in the Sunshine condition. The difference between the two conditions with
respect to the ultimate verdict (namely the dichotomous variable) was
statistically insignificant, yet consistent with the hypothesis. Larger samples may
yield a significant finding. To conclude, the prosecutor may benefit from using
the tactic when possible.54
The study also found that sympathy for the defendant in the Stealing
Sunshine condition was greater than in the Sunshine condition.55 This marginally
significant finding conforms to the positive teller–listener extremity effect.56 It
also indicates that the tactic does not work by reducing fact-finders’ sympathy
for the defendantit actually worked despite an increase in sympathy for the
defendant. Similarly, the study found that identification with the victim in the
Stealing Sunshine condition was weaker than in the Sunshine condition,
suggesting that the tactic does not work by increasing identification with the
victim.57 It worked despite a reduction in identification with the victim. The
differences between the two conditions in the other variables were not
significant.
Despite its apparent contribution to existing literature on persuasion
techniques, this is a preliminary study. Additional studies are necessary to
substantiate our basic finding. In particular, future research should test the
hypothesis with a more representative sample of the population of interest (that
is, potential fact-finders) to increase the external validity of the results. Special

53. A U.S. litigator should bear in mind, however, that “a party introducing evidence cannot
complain on appeal that the evidence was erroneously admitted.” Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753,
755 (2000); Perrin, supra note 7, at 647, 650–51.
54. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 45, at § 24.7(a); Carlson & Russo, supra note 46; see also supra
text accompanying note 47.
55. We emphasize that this finding is only marginally significant, as explained in Part IV. We
report and discuss it here due to the relatively small size of our sample.
56. See Inman et al., supra note 39, at 59–65, 73; see also supra text accompanying notes 39–41.
57. Again, this finding is only marginally significant, and we report and discuss it here due to the
relatively small size of our sample.
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attention should be given to three features of our sample that reflect the nature
of the student body of the psychology department at the University of Haifa: (1)
gender imbalance (73.2% of the participants were women); (2) limited age
range (17 through 35); and (3) participants’ education. We tend to believe that
these factors are not responsible for the results, but only larger and more
representative samples would enable comparison between different gender,
age, and education groups.
Although there is now reason to believe that stealing sunshine is an effective
tactic, it is not certain why that is so. In the Stealing Sunshine condition, the
prosecution revealed the positive information about the defendant without a
negative spin (framing). The results, therefore, do not support the argument
that framing underlies the efficacy of the tactic. Similarly, the fact that in the
Stealing Sunshine condition the defendant did not repeat the positive
information undermines the “old news is no news” argument. This study
showed that stealing the defendant’s sunshine did not impair the defendant’s
credibility, but perhaps it improved the prosecutor’s overall image and hence,
the prosecutor’s persuasiveness. Furthermore, we need to examine whether in
cases of stealing sunshine, fact-finders change the meaning of the representation
to better fit their expectation.
Further research is required to delineate the boundaries of the tactic’s
effectiveness in a given context. We need to determine, inter alia, whether the
tactic’s effectiveness depends on the exact timing of its use (namely early or
relatively late in trial), on the intensity of the sunshine stolen, on the personal
characteristics of the stealer or the fact-finder, or on the non-use of specific
counterstrategies.
Finally, further research is necessary to determine whether the tactic is also
effective in civil trials, and—perhaps more importantly—in non-legal contexts,
such as advertising, interpersonal relationships, organizational crisis
management, and politics. As explained above, “stealing thunder” was initially
studied as a courtroom technique, but subsequently proved effective in other
fields.58 We conjecture that the efficacy of stealing sunshine similarly transcends
the limited trial setting.

58. See supra notes 20–22.

